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Is the Global Toy Industry Too Dependent on Fewer and Fewer Retailers?


The Ever Growing Power of Amazon, Walmart, Target and the World's Retail Giants


For most of the modern history of the toy industry, getting products into retail has always been difficult. Manufacturers have had to convince buyers that their products deserve limited shelf space, compete against hundreds of rival products and demonstrate that they can supply reliably at the right price.


Today, however, there is another challenge emerging alongside all the traditional difficulties of the business: the number of genuinely important retail customers appears to be shrinking.

In many of the world's largest toy markets, a relatively small number of retailers now account for an enormous proportion of toy sales. Amazon, Walmart, Target and Costco dominate large parts of the US market. In the UK, Amazon and Smyths Toys are hugely influential, alongside major supermarkets and other chains. Across Europe, large specialist retailers, hypermarkets, supermarkets and online platforms continue to dominate distribution in their respective markets.


This raises an important strategic question for the global toy industry: are toy companies becoming too dependent on fewer and fewer retail customers?



For many businesses, the answer is probably yes. And the consequences of this growing concentration of retail power could have profound implications for toy companies, inventors, factories, licensors and the long-term structure of the industry itself.

Retail Consolidation Is Not New – But the Consequences Are Becoming More Significant

Retail consolidation has been taking place for decades. Independent toy shops gradually lost market share to specialist chains, while specialist chains increasingly competed against mass-market retailers. Department stores declined in importance, supermarkets expanded their toy departments and then e-commerce arrived, fundamentally changing the competitive landscape once again.


The result has been a gradual transfer of power away from thousands of smaller retailers towards a relatively small number of enormous organisations. The closure of Toys "R" Us in the United States was perhaps the most dramatic example of how quickly the retail landscape can change. One of the world's most important toy retailers disappeared, and its market share was redistributed among Walmart, Target, Amazon and numerous other retailers.


Initially, the disappearance of Toys "R" Us appeared to create opportunities for a broader range of retailers. In the longer term, however, it may have contributed to even greater concentration. Amazon continued to grow, Walmart strengthened its omnichannel capabilities and Target increased its focus on differentiated assortments, exclusive products and curated ranges.


Today, a toy company can potentially reach millions of consumers through just a handful of major accounts. That is extraordinarily efficient, but it also creates an obvious strategic risk. When a small number of customers account for such a large proportion of a supplier's business, the balance of power inevitably shifts.


The Financial Evidence Is Already Visible

One of the clearest indicators of retailer concentration can be found in the annual reports of major toy companies.


Mattel reported that Walmart, Target and Amazon collectively accounted for approximately 42% of its worldwide consolidated net sales in 2025, compared with approximately 44% in the previous year. That means three retail customers accounted for more than two-fifths of the worldwide revenue of one of the largest toy companies in the world.


This is a remarkable statistic. Mattel is a global business with operations across numerous countries, hundreds of products and some of the world's best-known toy brands. Yet despite its scale and international footprint, a very substantial proportion of its revenue still comes from just three customers.


For smaller companies, the dependence can be even more extreme. Jakks Pacific reported that Target and Walmart alone accounted for 26.6% and 26.1% respectively of its 2025 net sales. In other words, more than half of the company's business came from just two retail customers.


Winning a major listing with Walmart, Target or Amazon can transform a toy company overnight. The reverse is also true. Losing a major account, or suffering a significant reduction in business from one, can have an immediate and potentially severe impact on revenue, inventory levels and profitability.


Retailers Now Control More Than Just Shelf Space

Historically, retailers possessed enormous power simply because they controlled access to consumers. If a manufacturer wanted to sell toys nationally, it needed shelf space. A successful listing with a major retailer could make the difference between a product becoming a major commercial success or disappearing without trace.


Today, however, retailers increasingly control something potentially even more valuable than shelf space: consumer data.


Amazon knows what consumers search for, what they buy, what products they look at but do not purchase and which products consumers buy together. It has extensive information on pricing, conversion rates, search behaviour and advertising effectiveness. Walmart and Target are also developing increasingly sophisticated consumer data and retail media businesses.


This changes the relationship between manufacturers and retailers. Toy companies no longer simply need retailers for physical distribution. Increasingly, they need access to digital consumer discovery, advertising platforms and valuable information about purchasing behaviour.


The retailer is therefore becoming something much broader than simply a customer. Major retailers are now simultaneously distributors, media companies, advertising platforms and data businesses. That represents a significant and potentially permanent shift in the balance of power between retailers and suppliers.


Amazon Has Changed the Economics of Toy Retail

Amazon deserves particular attention because its influence extends far beyond simply being another major retailer.


Amazon is simultaneously a retailer, a marketplace, a search engine, an advertising platform, a logistics provider and a data company. For many consumers, it has become the first place they search when looking for a specific product, and that has important implications for the toy industry.


Historically, a child might see a toy advertised on television and then visit a toy shop with their parents. Today, a consumer might discover a product on TikTok, YouTube or Instagram and immediately search for it on Amazon. The journey from product discovery to purchase has become dramatically shorter.


This gives Amazon enormous influence over which products consumers ultimately buy. However, being listed on Amazon is not necessarily enough. Visibility increasingly depends on advertising investment, search ranking, consumer reviews, pricing, availability and fulfilment performance. Competitors are often only one click away.


For smaller toy companies, Amazon can therefore be both an extraordinary opportunity and a brutally competitive marketplace. The barriers to getting a product listed may be lower than securing a national listing with Walmart or Target, but the challenge of actually getting consumers to discover the product can be significant.


Walmart and Target Have Become Powerful Gatekeepers

In the United States, Walmart and Target remain critically important to the toy industry. A successful listing in Walmart can provide national scale almost immediately, while Target has become particularly important for companies offering differentiated, design-led, collectible and trend-driven products.


Both retailers are increasingly sophisticated buyers. They possess extensive sales data, understand consumer behaviour and can demand customised assortments, exclusive products and high levels of supply chain reliability. Because of their enormous scale, they also have substantial negotiating leverage with suppliers.


For a toy company, the relationship with a major retailer can therefore be both essential and challenging. Retailers want competitive prices, reliable supply, marketing support, exclusive products, rapid replenishment and strong margins. Increasingly, they also expect suppliers to participate in retail media programmes and other promotional activities.


Suppliers, meanwhile, want predictable orders, reasonable margins, long-term relationships and access to consumer data. Those objectives do not always align perfectly. And when one retailer represents 20%, 30% or even 50% of a company's business, there is little doubt about which side of the relationship has the stronger negotiating position.


Retailers Are Increasingly Asking for More

The relationship between retailer and supplier has become considerably more complex than it was in the past.


Traditionally, the commercial arrangement was relatively straightforward. The manufacturer developed and produced the product, the retailer bought it and then sold it to consumers. Of course, there were always negotiations over pricing, promotions and merchandising, but the basic relationship was clear.


Today, major retailers increasingly expect a much broader commercial partnership. Suppliers may be required to invest in retail media, sponsored advertising, digital marketing, promotional activity, exclusive products, customised packaging, specialist assortments and additional logistics services.


Retail media is particularly significant because major retailers have discovered that their consumer traffic and purchasing data are extremely valuable. Instead of simply earning money from selling products, retailers can now sell advertising access to the consumers visiting their websites and platforms.


For toy companies, this creates another cost of doing business. Getting a product listed is no longer necessarily the end of the sales process. In many cases, suppliers must also invest in making sure that consumers actually discover the product once it has reached the retailer's platform or shelves.


The International Picture Is Also Becoming Increasingly Concentrated

The United States is not unique in experiencing this trend.


Across much of the global toy market, a relatively small number of retailers dominate distribution. In the United Kingdom, specialist toy retail has become increasingly concentrated around a handful of significant players, while Amazon continues to exert substantial influence over online toy sales.


In continental Europe, major chains such as Smyths Toys, Carrefour, Auchan and other large retail groups have significant influence depending on the country. In some markets, hypermarkets and supermarkets remain particularly important, while in others specialist toy retailers dominate. In Australia and many other developed markets, a relatively small number of major retailers account for a substantial proportion of national toy sales.

The names may change from country to country, but the structural issue remains remarkably similar.


International expansion does not necessarily mean diversification. A toy company may sell products into ten or twenty countries but still be heavily dependent on a relatively small group of multinational retailers or dominant national chains. Funko's customer relationships provide a good example of this global pattern, with major retail partners including Amazon, Walmart, Target and GameStop in the United States, alongside Amazon, Smyths Toys and Carrefour in international markets.


There Are Genuine Advantages to Retail Concentration

It would be wrong to suggest that the growth of large retailers is entirely negative for toy companies.


There are substantial advantages to working with major retail organisations. Selling to five significant customers can be considerably more efficient than managing relationships with 500 independent accounts. Large retailers can reduce sales costs, simplify logistics and forecasting and provide access to sophisticated point-of-sale data.


Perhaps most importantly, they provide scale. A small toy company can potentially reach millions of consumers without having to build a huge direct sales and distribution infrastructure. A successful relationship with a major retailer can accelerate growth dramatically.


Major retailers can also provide valuable consumer insights that help suppliers make better decisions about product development, pricing, promotions, inventory and replenishment. Amazon and other online platforms additionally offer relatively accessible routes for companies wanting to test demand in international markets.


The problem, therefore, is not retail concentration in itself. The problem arises when concentration turns into excessive dependency.


The Biggest Risk Is the Loss of Negotiating Power

The fundamental issue is relatively simple.


If a retailer represents 5% of your business, you can probably afford to disagree with them. If a retailer represents 40% of your business, the relationship becomes considerably more complicated.


The retailer knows how important the business is to you, and that can inevitably influence negotiations over price, payment terms, promotional funding, returns, exclusivity, marketing expenditure and supply chain requirements.


This is basic economics. The more concentrated a supplier's customer base becomes, the greater the negotiating power of those customers. As retailers become larger and account for an increasing proportion of industry sales, suppliers can become increasingly dependent upon them.


That can create uncomfortable situations for toy companies. A supplier may know that certain commercial demands are damaging its margins or increasing its risk, but feel unable to challenge them because the potential consequences of losing the customer would be even worse.


The Consequences of Being Delisted Are Becoming More Severe

Retail concentration also increases the consequences of failure.


If a small independent toy shop stops stocking a product, it is disappointing but unlikely to threaten the entire business. If one of a company's top three customers removes its range, however, the consequences can be dramatic.


A major delisting can result in lost revenue, excess inventory, factory cancellations, cashflow problems and reduced production volumes. Lower production volumes can lead to higher unit costs, which in turn put further pressure on margins.



The situation can become self-reinforcing. A company loses business with a major retailer, its factory volumes decline, purchasing costs increase and profitability weakens. With less money available for marketing and product development, the company's competitive position can deteriorate further.

This is why customer concentration should be regarded as a significant strategic risk for toy companies, rather than simply being seen as a normal part of doing business.


Could Retail Consolidation Also Reduce Innovation?

There is another potential issue that receives less attention.

Could the increasing concentration of retail power eventually reduce innovation in the toy industry?


Large retailers understandably prefer products with a high probability of success. They want reliable suppliers, predictable supply chains and products that fit established categories. They are accountable for sales performance and cannot afford to fill valuable shelf space with products that have little chance of selling.


The difficulty is that genuinely innovative products are often difficult to predict. The next major toy phenomenon may not look like anything currently on the market.

Historically, specialist retailers and independent stores have often provided an important testing ground for unusual, innovative or niche products. Smaller retailers can sometimes take risks that major national chains cannot. They may be more willing to support an emerging brand, an unusual concept or a product that does not fit neatly into an established category.


If the retail landscape becomes dominated by fewer giant buyers, there is a risk that product assortments become increasingly conservative. Retailers may naturally gravitate towards established brands, major licences, proven product formats and existing suppliers.

That could make it harder for smaller companies and independent inventors to break into the industry. Ironically, however, major retailers need innovation just as much as anyone else. Consumers eventually become bored with seeing the same products, and the future growth of the industry depends upon new ideas continuing to reach the market.


Direct-to-Consumer Could Provide Part of the Answer

One potential response to retailer concentration is the continued growth of direct-to-consumer business.


The internet has made it possible for toy companies to develop direct relationships with consumers through their own websites, social media platforms, crowdfunding campaigns and other digital channels. Companies can now sell through their own websites, TikTok Shop, Kickstarter and other specialist platforms.


Direct-to-consumer offers some obvious advantages. Manufacturers can retain greater control over pricing, collect consumer data, test new products, build communities and launch limited editions. In some cases, margins may also be higher than through traditional wholesale channels.


However, direct-to-consumer is not a perfect solution. Building consumer traffic is expensive, digital advertising costs money and logistics and customer service require additional capabilities. Competing for consumer attention online can, in some ways, be just as difficult as competing for shelf space.



For most toy companies, direct-to-consumer is unlikely to replace major retail distribution entirely. What it can provide, however, is something extremely valuable: diversification.

The Most Successful Toy Companies Will Probably Be Omnichannel

The future of toy distribution is unlikely to be about choosing between traditional retail and direct-to-consumer.


The strongest companies will probably use multiple channels simultaneously. A modern toy company may sell through major mass-market retailers, specialist toy retailers, Amazon, other online marketplaces, direct-to-consumer websites, social commerce platforms, international distributors and independent retailers.


The objective should not necessarily be to avoid major retailers. That would be commercially unrealistic for many businesses.


Instead, the objective should be to avoid becoming dangerously dependent upon any single retailer or channel. Major retailers can remain enormously important commercial partners without becoming existentially important to the future of the company.

That distinction could become increasingly important during the next decade.


Retail Concentration Is Changing What Toy Companies Need to Be Good At

The rise of increasingly powerful retailers is also changing the capabilities required to operate a successful toy company.


Twenty years ago, a toy company might have focused primarily on product development, manufacturing, sales and marketing. Those capabilities remain essential, but they are no longer sufficient on their own.


Companies increasingly need expertise in e-commerce, retail media, digital marketing, data analytics, search optimisation, marketplace management and consumer community building. The modern toy company is becoming part product company, part media company and part technology company.


Those businesses that successfully adapt to this changing environment may thrive. Those that continue to rely entirely on traditional retail relationships, without developing alternative routes to market or stronger direct connections with consumers, could find themselves increasingly vulnerable.


Could Retailers Eventually Become Too Powerful?

There is also a broader question for the industry.

At what point does retailer concentration become unhealthy?


Retailers need suppliers, suppliers need retailers and consumers need both. A healthy industry requires a reasonable balance of power between the different participants.

If retailers become too dominant, suppliers may struggle to invest sufficiently in product innovation, brand building, marketing, manufacturing quality and long-term intellectual property development. If supplier margins become excessively compressed, the industry's ability to invest in the future could eventually be affected.


That would not necessarily benefit retailers either.

Retailers depend upon exciting new products to attract consumers. The toy industry cannot survive indefinitely on established franchises and proven product formats. New ideas are the lifeblood of the business.


The challenge is ensuring that the commercial structure of the industry continues to provide sufficient opportunities for innovation, experimentation and new companies to emerge.


The Toy Industry Needs More Routes to Market – Not Fewer

Perhaps the most important conclusion is that the toy industry should welcome the growth of major retailers while actively encouraging alternative routes to market.


A healthy toy industry needs large mass-market retailers, specialist toy chains, independent toy shops, online marketplaces, direct-to-consumer brands, social commerce platforms, crowdfunding businesses and international distributors.


The more routes a product has to reach consumers, the healthier the overall ecosystem is likely to be.


The danger comes when too much power becomes concentrated in too few organisations. When that happens, a relatively small number of buyers can increasingly influence which products consumers see, which companies succeed, what prices are considered acceptable and which innovations ultimately reach the market.


That is an extraordinary amount of influence for any small group of organisations to possess.


Conclusion: The Retail Giants Will Become Even More Important – But Dependency Remains Dangerous

The global toy industry is undoubtedly becoming increasingly dependent on a relatively small number of major retailers.


Amazon, Walmart, Target and other retail giants possess enormous influence over the commercial success of toy companies. Their scale offers tremendous advantages, including access to millions of consumers, sophisticated data, efficient distribution and the ability to help companies grow rapidly.


However, greater concentration also means greater dependency. Greater dependency can mean reduced negotiating power, and reduced negotiating power can ultimately affect margins, innovation and the long-term health of toy companies.

The smartest toy businesses will not attempt to avoid major retailers. That would make little commercial sense.


Instead, they will recognise the importance of diversification. They will build strong relationships with the world's largest retailers while simultaneously developing alternative routes to market. They will invest in direct-to-consumer capabilities, maintain relationships with specialist retailers, explore social commerce and seek to build stronger direct connections with consumers.


Most importantly, they will try to ensure that no single retailer has the power to determine their entire future.


Because in the modern toy industry, getting listed with a major retailer can transform a business.


But becoming too dependent on one can also leave that business dangerously exposed.

The future of the toy industry may not be about whether retailers become bigger. They almost certainly will.


The more important question is whether toy companies can maintain enough independence, diversity and bargaining power to thrive alongside them.

That could become one of the defining strategic challenges for the global toy industry during the next decade.



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The Aisle Is Splitting in Two: Kids’ Toys, Adult Collectibles, and the Companies Caught in the Middle

Walk a toy aisle in 2026 and you can feel the split before you read a single age grade.

On one side is the business the industry was built to run: preschool, dolls, vehicles, outdoor, the Christmas list, the parent with a basket and a budget. On the other is a different shop wearing the same category code. Sealed cases of cards. Eighteen-plus building sets. Blind-box figures designed to sit on a desk, not survive a sandpit. A Labubu hanging from a bag that never belonged to a seven-year-old.


The industry still files both of those worlds under toys. The consumer does not.

That is the uncomfortable truth behind a year of handsome headlines. Circana put the global toy market at 123 billion dollars in 2025, up 8 percent. The United States has spent 2026 looking even stronger, with adults and teens doing a disproportionate amount of the lifting. Adult-only households have accounted for more than half of U.S. toy sales. Sales to adults aged 18 and over have been among the largest contributors to growth. Teens aged 12 to 17 have been the fastest-growing recipient group. Put those older buyers together and you get most of the incremental dollars.


Children under 10 still account for the majority of global toy sales. That sentence should be printed above every strategy deck that has decided the kid business is yesterday. The core has not vanished. Its share is slipping, and almost all of the excitement, the margin, and the conference-panel oxygen has moved up the age range.


Kidult is no longer a cute adjacent line. In some estimates it is already more than a quarter of global toy sales. Treat it as a trend and you will mismanage both halves of the aisle.

Two businesses, one set of shelves


The children’s toy business is a seasonal machine. You forecast, you sell in, you hope the commercial lands, you sweat January returns, and you start again. The customer is often not the user. The product has to survive siblings, schools, and a parent who will put it back if the price looks silly. Safety, durability, and a clear play pattern still matter more than scarcity.

The adult collectible business is a hobby business that borrowed the toy industry’s plumbing. The customer is the user. They buy all year. They will pay more. They care about drops, display, community, secondary-market prices, and whether the brand is still cool next Tuesday. A missed ship date does not just annoy a buyer. It can wreck a drop culture you spent two years building.


Those are not two SKUs in the same range. They are two operating systems.


LEGO understood this early and built a visible adult business: Icons, Botanicals, Formula 1, large licensed display sets, packaging that does not apologise for being sold to someone with a mortgage. Pokémon has spent years living in both rooms at once, which is why games and puzzles keep reporting growth numbers that make the rest of the aisle look stationary. Pop Mart and the Labubu complex did not ask permission from the traditional toy calendar at all. They built a collector engine and let the toy trade catch up.

Plenty of other companies are trying to stand in the doorway between those rooms. That is where the trouble starts.


The companies caught in the middle

The middle is a traditional toy company that needs the collectible dollar and still has to fill a preschool planogram.


Its design team is trained to hit a price point and a play pattern. Its sales team is trained to talk to the same buyers they have known for twenty years. Its finance team is trained to weight the year toward the fourth quarter. Then the board asks why they do not have a Labubu, a card program, or an eighteen-plus line that photographs well.


So the company does what companies do. It takes a children’s mould and gives it a collector box. It slaps a numbered edition on something that was never scarce. It launches a blind bag of characters nobody collects. It tells the sales force to push the new adult line into the same aisle that already cannot fit the core range.


Retail plays along, up to a point. Cards, squish, premium building, and a handful of viral figures have been genuine traffic engines. Colliers has been blunt about it: toys and collectibles are pulling people into stores. Adult Lego, Pokémon and trading cards, Squishmallows, Labubu — these are the names shoppers cite. Target talking about a billion-dollar trading-card business is not a toy-aisle anecdote. It is a sign that part of the category has left childhood behind.


The middle gets crushed when the same organisation tries to serve a parent buying a first doll and a thirty-five-year-old hunting a sealed product as if they were the same customer with different birthdays. They are not. They shop differently, they return differently, they talk about the brand differently, and they punish different mistakes.


A children’s line that becomes too collector will lose the parent. A collector line that becomes too childish will lose the adult. A company that splits the difference often gets neither.


Cards are the loudest proof

If you strip trading cards out of recent growth figures, the toy market looks a lot more ordinary. That should end the argument about whether this is a broad renaissance of play. In 2025, collectibles did a huge amount of the work, and cards did a huge amount of the collectibles work. Games and puzzles have kept posting spectacular percentages in 2026, with Pokémon near the centre of the story.


Cards are not a slightly more expensive packet of stickers. They are a product with a secondary market, a content engine, organised play, digital companions, and a consumer who will stand in a queue at midnight. The competencies look more like a hobby publisher or a fashion drop brand than a classic toy company: cadence, scarcity, authentication, community management, and the nerve to leave demand unsatisfied.

That last point is heresy in the old toy model, which was built to fill every hole on the shelf. Collector culture needs holes. Flood the channel and you do not create a mass market. You create a crash.


Companies coming from dolls, vehicles, or plush keep learning this the expensive way. They over-ship the hot collectible because that is what you do when something is working. Six months later the secondary price has collapsed, the community has moved on, and the buyer wants to talk about returns.


The child has not left the building

It is possible to get so excited about adults that you forget who still plays on the floor.

Preschool does not trend on the same apps. It does not produce the same average selling price. It is still the farm system for the entire industry. The child who is four today is the collector you want in 2036, and they will only get there if someone keeps making good first toys: clear play, honest materials, brands that mean something at the kitchen table.


There is a quiet risk in the current numbers. Head offices follow growth. Growth is with teens and adults. Budgets follow growth. The children’s development list gets thinner, safer, more licensed, more like last year with a new face. That is how a company wakes up owning a collector business and renting its future.


The smart operators are not abandoning kids. They are separating the work. Different teams, different price architecture, different retail conversations, different content plans. One side talks to parents and teachers. The other talks to fans and communities. Both may share a factory and a logo. They should not share a forecast template.


Retail is splitting even when the fixture is not

The physical aisle is lagging the consumer.


In many stores the collector product still sits next to the infant rattle because that is where the toy buyer lives. Meanwhile the adult is already shopping elsewhere: hobby shops, pop-up drops, official sites, marketplaces, theme-park bakeries, supermarket impulse space that has nothing to do with the traditional toy planogram.


That creates a nasty reporting problem. The industry congratulates itself on toy growth that is partly hobby growth flowing through toy codes. Buyers compare year-on-year space productivity and wonder why the old toy brands look flat. They look flat because the oxygen went to products that behave like collectibles, fashion, or trading-card programs.


Independent retailers feel this first. The specialist who knows how to sell a premium building set or a card box can have a very good year. The generalist who needed the everyday children’s line to pay the rent is staring at the same split the manufacturers are, with less room to hedge.


What to do if you are stuck in the door

If your company makes things for children and now wants adults as well, the first job is honesty. You are not extending a range. You are entering a second industry.


That means asking questions the old toy P&L does not like. Who is the customer on the day of purchase? Is the product for play, display, trade, or gifting between adults? What happens to brand trust if we make it scarce? What happens to brand trust if we do not? Can our factory handle short collector runs without starving the core line? Can our sales team present two stories in one meeting without turning both of them into mush?

If the answers are fuzzy, you are not in the collector business. You are in the business of putting foil on a carton.


If you are already a collector brand looking at children’s retail, be just as careful in the other direction. Kids’ toys have rules that fandom culture treats as optional: safety regimes, advertising standards, price architecture a parent will accept, and a play pattern that works when there is no drop, no queue, and no resale page.


The aisle will not go back to being one thing

The toy industry likes to talk as if play is universal and therefore the market must be too. Play is universal. Commerce is not.


We now have a children’s toy industry that still needs craft, distribution, and patience, and an adult collectible industry that needs cadence, community, and restraint. They share factories, fairs, and sometimes brand names. They do not share a customer, a calendar, or a definition of success.


The companies that will look clever in five years are the ones that pick a side for each line and resource it properly. The companies that will look busy and puzzled are the ones still trying to sell a baby toy and a desk ornament off the same forecast, to the same buyer, with the same joke about kidults in the presentation.


The aisle has already split. The only question left is whether your organisation has.


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Q2 2026 Toy Co Earnings Roundup: What the Numbers Mean for the Toy & Game Business

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Q2 2026 Earnings Deep Dive: What the Results Reveal About the Toy & Game Business

The second-quarter 2026 earnings season for the major toy and game companies confirmed a clear bifurcation in the industry. Demand remains healthy but highly selective, concentrated in collectibles, licensed entertainment properties, vehicles, action figures and especially tabletop and digital gaming. Traditional dolls and preschool categories continue to lag. At the same time, tariffs, input-cost inflation, elevated marketing spend and strategic investments are compressing margins even as top-line growth materialises. Most companies either reaffirmed or raised full-year guidance, signalling confidence that the second half — historically the industry’s strongest period — will deliver improved profitability.


Below is a more detailed examination of the results from Mattel, Hasbro, Spin Master, Jakks Pacific and Funko, followed by what the collective picture means for the remainder of 2026.

 

Mattel

Strong Top Line, Margin Pressure, Strategic Progress

Mattel reported net sales of $1.125 billion, up 10% as reported and 9% in constant currency. Growth was broad-based geographically: North America rose 12%, EMEA 7% and Asia Pacific 4%, while Latin America was flat. Category performance told a familiar story. Vehicles (led by Hot Wheels, up roughly 12%) and the Action Figures, Building Sets, Games and Other segment (up more than 30%) drove the majority of the gain. Dolls and Infant, Toddler & Preschool declined.


Gross margin fell 270 basis points to 48.2% (adjusted 48.6%). Management quantified the pressures: approximately 170 basis points from tariffs, 120 from inflation, 110 from higher royalties and 60 from FX, partially offset by contributions from the newly consolidated Mattel163 digital-games business and cost-savings programmes. Adjusted operating income dropped to $39 million from $96 million a year earlier, and adjusted EPS was just $0.01 versus $0.21.


CEO Ynon Kreiz emphasised continued execution of the multi-year strategy to build an IP-driven play and family-entertainment business. Proof points included the global release of the Masters of the Universe movie (which became the No. 1 film on Prime Video and the most-watched movie across U.S. streaming in its first week), the launch of Mattel’s first self-published mobile game, and progress integrating Mattel163. The company was again ranked No. 1 globally in dolls, vehicles and infant/toddler/preschool by Circana data and gained share in action figures.


Mattel reiterated full-year 2026 guidance of 3–6% constant-currency net sales growth, adjusted gross margin of approximately 50%, adjusted operating income of $580–630 million and adjusted EPS of $1.27–1.39. Management also reaffirmed its $400 million share-repurchase target for the year (having already bought back $300 million year-to-date). Looking further ahead, executives pointed to 2027 as a stronger year, with mid- to high-single-digit revenue growth and strong double-digit profit growth expected as investments in content, digital games and brand initiatives mature.

 

Hasbro

The Gaming Powerhouse and Guidance Raise

Hasbro delivered the strongest relative performance of the group. Revenue rose 16% to $1.140 billion, driven by a 27% increase in Wizards of the Coast & Digital Gaming and a 5% rise in Consumer Products. Entertainment declined 20%. Magic: The Gathering had a standout quarter, eclipsing $500 million in quarterly revenue for the first time in its history, powered by the Secrets of Strixhaven and Marvel Super Heroes sets. CEO Chris Cocks described Magic as a “mega franchise” comparable to Pokémon or major gaming titles, noting its long-term compounding growth.


Adjusted operating profit increased 14% to $282 million despite a $56 million non-cash impairment related to the cancellation of certain digital-games projects planned for 2028 and beyond. Adjusted EPS was $1.28. The company returned $133 million to shareholders via dividends and buybacks and repaid $55 million of debt.


On the strength of the first-half results, Hasbro raised full-year guidance: constant-currency revenue growth of 5–7% (previously 3–5%), adjusted operating margin of 25–26% and adjusted EBITDA of $1.45–1.50 billion. Management highlighted continued momentum in Magic, solid performance from Star Wars, Marvel, Peppa Pig and Hasbro Gaming, and a more focused digital investment strategy.

 

Spin Master

Return to Profitability and Movie Momentum

Spin Master reported revenue of $436.4 million, up 8.9% (8.3% constant currency). Toy revenue grew approximately 12%, helped by roughly $40 million of orders pulled forward from the third quarter as retailers prepared for PAW Patrol: The Dino Movie. Core brands including PAW Patrol, Monster Jam and GUND performed well, alongside newer lines such as 4D Crystal Links and Cool Maker.

The company swung to an operating profit and delivered adjusted EBITDA of $51.6 million (margin 11.8% versus 7.2% a year earlier). The improvement reflected higher gross profit, lower marketing spend (timing-related) and approximately $38 million in tariff refunds. Adjusted net income was $8.6 million, or $0.08 per diluted share.



CEO Christina Miller described the quarter as a return to profitable growth and reiterated the full-year outlook of stable to low-single-digit revenue growth and mid- to upper-single-digit adjusted EBITDA growth. Management noted that the second half is typically weighted more heavily (last year it represented 64% of full-year revenue) and that innovation in collectibles and trading cards remains a priority.

 

Jakks Pacific

Rebound and International Strength

Jakks Pacific posted net sales of $139.2 million, up 17% year-over-year — a recovery from the prior-year period when sudden tariff implementation had sharply reduced orders. Toys/Consumer Products rose 21% to $97.5 million, led by Action Play & Collectibles (notably Super Mario and other Nintendo properties). Costumes grew 8%. North America sales increased 20% in the quarter; international sales reached their highest first-half level in more than a decade.


Gross margin held relatively steady at 32.3%. The company reported net income of $5.9 million ($0.49 diluted EPS), aided by tariff refunds recorded in non-operating income. Adjusted EPS was $0.25 and adjusted EBITDA improved to $5.4 million. Cash stood at $60.6 million and inventory declined year-over-year, reflecting better working-capital management.

Chairman and CEO Stephen Berman said the year is developing as planned and that the company is well positioned for the second half, with continued focus on content-led products and international expansion.

 

Funko

Strong Sales, Record Margins and Raised Guidance

Funko reported second-quarter net sales of $207.7 million, up 7% year-over-year, driven by 9% growth in Core Collectibles and 19% growth in Europe. Gross margin reached a record 56.6%, which included a $25.4 million pre-tax benefit from the recognition of expected tariff refunds and the release of accrued tariffs (44.4% excluding the benefit).


Net income was $15.4 million, or $0.27 per diluted share, compared with a substantial loss a year earlier. Adjusted EBITDA came in at $40.9 million (approximately $15 million excluding the tariff-related benefit), well above the company’s prior guidance range of $5–10 million for the quarter. The company used proceeds from the sale of certain tariff claims to reduce debt by $15 million.


Funko reiterated its full-year net sales outlook of flat to up 3% and raised its adjusted EBITDA guidance to $100–110 million (from the previous $70–80 million range), incorporating the second-quarter tariff benefit plus underlying profitability improvement. Core Pop! collectibles continued to show resilience, supported by strong entertainment properties, while the company maintained focus on higher-productivity SKUs and cost discipline.


Cross-Cutting Themes for the Industry Several consistent patterns emerge across the results:


  • Demand is polarised. High-engagement, fandom-driven and gaming categories are thriving. More traditional play patterns (classic dolls, preschool) remain under pressure.

  • Margins are the key battleground. Tariff costs, inflation and higher marketing/royalty spend are the primary headwinds. Companies with favourable mix (gaming, collectibles) or one-time benefits (tariff refunds) are navigating the pressure more successfully.

  • Entertainment and digital remain strategic priorities. Mattel’s film and mobile-games progress, Hasbro’s Magic dominance, Spin Master’s movie pull-forward, Jakks’ licensed content and Funko’s collectibles strength all underline the industry’s shift toward IP-centric, multi-platform franchises.

  • Retailer behaviour is constructive. Order pull-forwards and improved inventory discipline suggest retailers are stocking more confidently for the holiday period than in the recent past.

  • Capital returns and balance-sheet strength matter. Share buybacks, dividends and debt reduction remain prominent, particularly at Mattel and Hasbro (with Funko also prioritising debt paydown).

 

Outlook for the Global Toy & Game business for the remainder of 2026

Most management teams expressed confidence that the second half will be stronger. Holiday demand is expected to benefit from a solid entertainment slate (PAW Patrol, Super Mario, additional Magic sets, Spiderman and other licensed properties). Margin recovery is anticipated as cost actions take hold, tariff impacts are better managed and higher-margin mix continues.


Key risks include further tariff volatility, any softening in consumer discretionary spending, and the precise timing of major entertainment releases. Opportunities lie in the continued expansion of the adult/kidult consumer, the structural growth of tabletop and digital gaming, and the ability of companies with strong IP portfolios to monetise across toys, collectibles, games and content.


Overall, Q2 2026 results portray an industry that is growing selectively and investing for the longer term. Companies with diversified IP, meaningful gaming or collectibles exposure and agile supply chains are best placed to convert current momentum into improved profitability as the sector enters its most important selling season. The second half of 2026 will be the real test of whether margin pressure can be overcome while demand remains constructive.

 

Analysis based on company earnings releases, SEC filings, earnings-call summaries and related commentary available as of early August 2026. Figures are as reported or adjusted by the respective companies. Market conditions can change rapidly.

 



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